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As early as 1968, Velten proposed a method for indu-cing mood states in controlled laboratory situations,
opening up a new chapter in basic research on human
emotions. The procedure used by Velten consisted in
drawing up three lists of 60 sentences in the first person
(i.e., self-referential). Each list had a different emotional
content: depressive, euphoric or neutral. There were
three groups of subjects, so that each group read only
one of the three lists of sentences. Subsequently, all sub-
jects were administered various psychological tests, and
it was found that this simple procedure induced a mood
state capable of producing marked differences in writing
speed, decision-making speed, word association and
subjective expression of affect. The importance of these
results is due to the fact that, until now, basic research on
emotions has focused on its antecedents, especially cog-
nitive determinants, on the analysis of subjective expe-
rience and on physiological concomitants; but not so
much on the way emotional states alter psychological
functioning. 
Currently, it is accepted that a particular mood state
includes not only an affective component, that is, a sub-
jective experience, but also a cognitive context and a
general state of the organism (Mayer, Salovey,
Gomberg-Kaufman and Blainey, 1991). However, as
regards the relationships between these different compo-
nents, a variety of approaches can be found. There are
those who argue that it is thinking that produces both
affective states, that is, the experience of emotion, and
behaviours associated with the emotions and all other
effects derived from them (Lazarus, 1982). Others, like
Zajonc (1980), defend the primacy of affect over cogni-
tion. Finally, there are intermediate propositions, such as
those of Teasdale and Fogarty (1979), who suggest a
reciprocal relationship between cognition and affect,
since, while some cognitions might produce changes in
mood states, these states may, in turn, affect or alter cer-
tain cognitive processes, such as memory. 
Bower (1981, 1987, 1992) made a considerable contri-
bution to research on the relationship between emotion
and cognition, demonstrating the influence of mood sta-
tes on memory and other cognitive processes, develo-
ping new experimental procedures, producing an impor-
tant body of empirical data and formulating an influen-
tial theory on the relationship between emotions and
cognition. 
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Mood state and recall biases: the role of affect. In this experiment, mood states were induced by exposure to two film clips,
one happy and another sad, without any specific verbal instruction from experimenters. Subsequently, tests of immediate
memory were performed. Subjects had to remember lists of positive, negative or neutral words. Results show that watching
films produces a reliable and strong bias on remembering but a lesser effect on expression of mood. Moreover, verbal affect
expression and biased remembering were unrelated. These results are more favourable to a cognitive priming hypothesis
than to an affective state-dependent one.
El presente trabajo consiste en un experimento en el que se inducen estados de nimo mediante la exposicin a unas pel-
culas (una alegre y otra triste) sin instrucciones concretas por parte de los experimentadores y se realizaran pruebas de
memoria inmediata de listas que contenan palabras neutras, con connotaciones alegres y con connotaciones tristes. Los
resultados indican que mientras el efecto de la exposicin a las pelculas sobre el recuerdo de palabras fue claro y consis-
tente, los cambios subjetivos del estado de nimo fueron dbiles, sin que ambos efectos mostraran ningn tipo de correla-
cin. Estos resultados son ms favorables a la hiptesis que destaca el papel de la preparacin cognitiva que a la basada
en el estado afectivo.
In one of his early works, Bower (1981) induced a state
of happiness or sadness by means of hypnotic sugges-
tion. While in this state subjects had to read a story
involving two characters, one a cheerful person for
whom things always turned out well, and the other a sad
character for whom things always went wrong. The
following day, in a neutral mood state, subjects were
asked what they remembered of the story. The results
suggest that those induced with a sad mood state remem-
bered the sad character, and vice-versa. This work,
together with others, demonstrated that information is
selected according to its degree of congruence with sub-
jectÕs mood state at the time he/she is processing it. 
Similar results have been found by other research
groups using somewhat different procedures. Using
VeltenÕs method, evidence has been accumulated in sup-
port of the notion that when a particular mood state is
induced and subjects are asked to recall autobiographi-
cal episodes, the content of these apparently free reca-
lled memories is consistent with the mood state induced
(see Rholes, Riskind and Lane, 1987; Matthews and
McLeod, 1994). Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978)
found similar results using a different method. These
authors presented to their subjects a list of words with
different emotional value and asked them to remember
as many of them as they could after experiencing a situa-
tion of success or failure. The words that coincided with
the mood state produced in the subject were more fre-
quently recalled than the incongruent ones. Also, it is
well established empirically that natural depressive epi-
sodes increase access to memories of sad episodes from
the past (Matthews and McLeod, 1994). 
To the above we might add the following: mood states
related to happiness, sadness or anger affect free asso-
ciation tasks carried out with words of neutral emotional
content; such states also bias the interpretation of ambi-
guous scenes and influence judgements with respect to
familiar objects and people about whom heterogeneous
impressions have been stored; and finally, they affect the
subjective probability of the occurrence of future events
(see Matthews and McLeod, 1994). Furthermore, mood
states can also alter expectations of self-efficacy
(Kavanagh and Bower, 1985). In sum, a great quantity
of processes related to cognition that appear to determi-
ne emotions may also be biased and influenced, in turn,
by emotions themselves. 
In order to explain these findings, Bower (1987, 1992)
has proposed that the way in which an experience is
codified in the memory is determined, at least partly, by
the mood state of the subject at the moment of carrying
out this codification. Further, the similarity between the
mood states at the time of acquisition and at the moment
of recall may also determine accessibility to memory.
This would occur through the activation of certain emo-
tional nodules that include the physical experience of
each emotion, expressive behaviour, verbal labels and
the situations that can produce emotions. These nodules
would be connected to propositional networks, so that
inducing the emotional state would also activate the
whole network. Since pleasant experiences are codified
precisely when one is in a good mood, these experiences
will be remembered more easily when the subject is
once more in a good mood and, conversely, sad or nega-
tive memories will be easier to evoke when the subject
is in a state of depression. 
BowerÕs approach, as Teasdale and Fogarty point out
(1979), has diverse interpretations, and has had implica-
tions for the development of subsequent models of the
relationship between cognition and emotions. In fact, it
is a perspective that is too general and unspecific to pro-
vide concrete predictions. The problems with this gene-
ral theory of cognitive processing dependent on mood
state have become numerous, and are clearly exposed by
Matthews and McLeod (1994). 
At the present time, one of the questions raised con-
cerns which characteristics of mood states are sufficient
and necessary to produce bias in the processing of infor-
mation. In this line, Rholes et al. (1987) proposed an
alternative theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon
in question, and one with some very interesting practical
implications. These authors make a distinction between
two alternative explanations of the way in which mood
state influences memory. The first interpretation is based
on the so-called mood state dependent mechanism
(Bower, 1981; Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979), to which we
have already referred, and which presupposes that all the
elements of the emotional nodules are activated together
and are necessary for producing bias in the processing of
information. The second interpretation supports the
view that the impact of mood states is influenced mainly
by the cognitions that accompany them, and not so much
by the emotional experience. This interpretation is based
on studies that demonstrate that the repeated exposition
or use of a certain schema, concept or word makes any
material associated with it easier to recall. Thus, it is
supposed that a situation that provokes an emotion acti-
vates both an affect and a related cognition. This cogni-
tion may semantically prepare or guide other processes
(such as the memory of life experiences) associated with
it. In other words, it would be the cognition related with
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the mood state and not the affect itself (the emotional
experience) that influences selective memory (Higgins,
Rholes and Jones, 1977; Higgins and King, 1980).
These two mechanisms Ðrecall dependent upon general
mood state and memory prepared only cognitivelyÐ are,
of course, not incompatible. 
Rholes et al (1987) tested both explanations, compa-
ring the inducement of mood states using both phrases
that primed affect Ðthat is, the subjective experience and
perception of somatic changesÐ and those that represen-
ted self-evaluations which made no specific reference to
sensations or experiences. Examples of the first type of
sentence would be: IÕm sad or My heart is heavy, and of
the second, IÕve failed or IÕve made a fool of myself.
They found that both types of sentence were capable of
producing changes in mood state, but that those based on
self-evaluations had more influence on selective
memory. The authorsÕ conclusion was that affective
experience (the subjective experience produced by
mood state) is not relevant to the matters we are discus-
sing here. 
Within this line of work on induced mood states, the
quest for a method that is at once simple, easy to admi-
nister, quick, and which would induce a strong and con-
sistent mood state has provided the motivation for some
research. The original method proposed by Velten conti-
nues to be widely used, though hypnotic induction has
also been employed with good results (Bower, 1981;
Natalie and Hantas, 1982), as we mentioned earlier.
Nevertheless, these methods have not been without their
critics. Another method, frequently used in clinical con-
texts, is that developed by Mosak (see Brewer, Doughtie
and Lubin, 1980), in which subjects are asked to recall
events from their own lives that have been especially sad
or happy. Series of self-referential statements and auto-
biographical anecdotes have in common cognitive bases
as causal factors of mood states. The procedures using
one and the other approach, however, differ in that while
autobiographical memories are individual and refer to
feelings as they occurred in reality, the series of self-
referential statements are general, and refer to feelings
and thoughts in hypothetical situations. 
The direct experience of failure or success has also
been used to induce mood states Ðfor example obtaining
a result higher or lower than expected in a cognitive
laboratory task (Edo, 1994). Another method used has
been to have subjects listen to recorded stories that indu-
ce depressive states (Goodwin and Williams, 1982). 
It would appear that, whatever the method used, it is
not too difficult to obtain the results found in the litera-
ture. The majority of procedures presented have
demonstrated their effectiveness, be it to different degre-
es, for inducing a depressed mood state and effects on
behaviour congruent with such a state, assessed through
activity (speed of writing, reckoning, etc.), through
quantitative and prosodic aspects of speech, through abi-
lity and through motivation in problem-solving and non-
verbal communication tasks Ðnot to mention the effects
on memory and recall already referred to. 
Our opinion is that the preferred method should be as
simple as possible, with the minimum of intervention
and instructions from the experimenter, and as different
as possible from the subsequent tests or tasks. Some
methods require that the experimenter, directly or more
subtly, asks the subject to feel sad or happy. This may
influence the mood state self-report that the subject
makes subsequently, since it introduces what is known
as the experimental Òdemand effectÓ, that is, a situation
in which the subject may emphasise that which he/she
thinks may please the experimenter (Hulley and
Cummings, 1993). 
The method of inducing mood states by means of the
showing of films with sad or happy content (or at least
with content that is so considered by a majority of vie-
wers) has the advantage that no special instructions are
required that induce a subject to feel something in parti-
cular: participants in the experiment simply watch the
films. Moreover, attention is guaranteed precisely
because of the emotional content of the films and, given
that it is visual and auditory material, there is less formal
similarity with the memory tasks, which are based on
read and written material. 
Our objective is to examine the role of affect in recall
bias resulting from mood state, using a method of non-
self-referential induction. Specifically, the method used
is the presentation of audiovisual material with sad or
happy content. Our aim is to assess both the impact of
these films on affect and the bias they can induce with
regard to selective recall of emotionally-charged words.
If the effect of mood states on selective memory is
mediated by affect, we should find a correlation betwe-
en magnitude of affective state and recall bias; in the
opposite case no such correlation should exist. 
METHOD
Subjects 
The initial sample of subjects was made up of 50 student
volunteers who received no type of reward or payment
for their participation. One subject was subsequently
excluded from the analysis after obtaining extreme sco-
VOLUME 2. NUMBER 1. 1998. PSYCHOLOGY IN SPAIN94
res in the questionnaires assessing symptoms of anxiety
and depression. The definitive sample was made up of
49 subjects, with a mean age of 21.5 years (Confidence
Interval (CI) 95%: 20.7 to 22.2 years), of whom 40 were
women (CI 95%: 68% to 91%). 
Material 
The material used in each experimental session inclu-
ded: 
- BeckÕs Depression Inventory, BDI. We used the
Spanish adaptation (Conde and Useros, 1976). This
scale consists of a self-assessment inventory of 21
items, each of which includes between 4 and 8 mani-
festations gradated in increasing order of intensity of
depressive symptoms. The items refer to aspects such
as mood, pessimism, suicidal desires, social abandon-
ment, indecision and weight loss, among others. 
- State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI-E. We used only
the state form of the Spanish adaptation (Spielber,
Gorsuch and Lushene, 1982), which contains 20
items that measure on a 4- point Likert scale (where
0 corresponds to ÔnoneÕ and 4 to ÔhighÕ) the general
level or general state of anxiety. 
- The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List - Revised,
MAACL-R (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1985). We used a
translation made by ourselves of the 132 adjectives
in the list. There were two versions, one in the mas-
culine form and another in the feminine, and the
adjectives were printed on a single sheet, in three
alphabetically-ordered columns. From this list the
subject had to indicate as many adjectives as he/she
wanted that described his/her state at that moment.
The scoring system was much simpler than in the
original, given that adjectives were classified in just
two groups: positive, or pleasant, and negative, or
unpleasant, and the number of adjectives from each
group marked by each subject was counted. Since
the numbers of adjectives in each group were une-
qual (72 negative and 60 positive), the number of
adjectives marked by each subject in each group was
divided by the number of adjectives in that group
and a corrected score obtained, which was used in all
subsequent analyses. As the scores obtained in this
way are not standardised for the Spanish population,
the data have only been used for comparing the res-
ponses of subjects participating in this study, without
extrapolating conclusions to the general population. 
- Immediate recall test: For this test five different lists
were used. These lists were formed of 7 words
whose content evoked positive emotions, 7 words
whose content evoked negative emotions and 7 neu-
tral words, distributed randomly. The presentation of
the lists was made using a slide projector. 
- Videotapes with emotional content. This material con-
sisted of: a clip from a Spanish TV documentary
about Òchild slavery in the worldÓ, of some 15
minutesÕ duration (this film was used to induce a
negative Ðdepressive or sadÐ mood in the subjects)
and an excerpt from the Woody Allen film
ÒEverything you always wanted to know about sex
(but were afraid to ask)Ó, of similar duration to the
other clip, and which was used to induce a positive
(euphoric or happy) mood state. Selection of these
materials was made from a list of possible excerpts
with the following characteristics: running time of
10 to 15 minutes, with sad or happy content (this
emotional character being the most salient feature of
the excerpt, over and above informative or other
aspects), and suitable for the type of subject partici-
pating in the study. In addition to that of the authors,
the opinion was sought of a further colleague from
the faculty who was aware of the studyÕs require-
ments; the two clips were chosen unanimously by
this selection group. 
Procedure 
The study was carried out collectively over five schedu-
led sessions in a lecture room of the Psychology faculty
during teaching hours. Each subject attended a single
session according to his or her timetable. It was attemp-
ted to make session numbers as equal as possible, with
the smallest being 7 and the largest 15. 
At the beginning of each session subjects were provi-
ded with a booklet containing the questionnaires to be
filled out and blank sheets on which to write down the
words recalled in the memory tasks. The material was
put in order according to the sequence of the tasks, and
subjects were requested not to look at any of it until they
received instructions from the experimenter. 
At the beginning of the session participants were asked
to complete the BDI and STAI-E questionnaires. A first
memory task was then administered, consisting in the
presentation of 5 lists of 21 words each (7 with positive
emotional valence, 7 with negative valence and 7 neutral
words), projected onto a screen. Viewing time for each
list was 30 seconds, after which 45 seconds were allo-
wed for subjects to write in their booklets as many
words as they remembered from the list. This procedure
was repeated for each of the 5 lists.
Once these preliminary tasks had been administered
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subjects were shown one of the selected films. The order
of presentation of these excerpts was balanced in the dif-
ferent sessions. In the first, third and fifth sessions the
sad sequence was shown first; in the second and fourth
sessions it was the happy film that was shown first.
There was no indication that order of presentation of the
clips affected subjectsÕ responses. 
Immediately after seeing the film, subjects were admi-
nistered the MAACL-R adjective task, indicating which
adjectives best described them at that moment. After this
adjective task a second memory test was administered.
The same words as used at the beginning of the session
were projected, but distributed randomly in five new
lists (which again contained 7 positive, 7 negative and 7
neutral words). 
Subsequently, the other film excerpt was shown, and
the same steps followed as with the first excerpt: admi-
nistration of the MAACL-R and a third memory test, for
which 5 further word lists were drawn up, following the
procedure as above. 
At the end of this experimental session the subjects
were thanked for their participation and asked not to dis-
cuss its content with their colleagues. 
RESULTS 
Subjects obtained normal scores on the BDI and STAI-
E questionnaires. 84% of them obtained a total score on
the BDI of 10 points or less, and none scored a total of
more than 8 points on the STAI-E. Only in one case was
an extreme score found: 18 points on the BDI, which led
to the exclusion of this subjectÕs data from the subse-
quent analysis. 
In the first place it was checked whether the showing
of the film clips had been effective as a procedure for
inducing emotions. In order to do this we compared the
positive and negative adjectives from the MAACL-R list
that the subjects had marked after watching each excerpt
(see Table 1). The statistical analysis was carried out
through comparison of means with the Student-Fisher t
test. The mean of positive adjectives marked (Row 1)
was higher after watching the happy clip than after the
sad one (t=5.10; P<0.0005), and the mean of negative
adjectives marked (Row 2) was higher after watching
the sad film (t=7.83; P< 0.0005). However, it was also
observed that subjects marked more positive then nega-
tive adjectives both after watching the happy excerpt
(column 1: t=10.34; P<0.0005) and after the sad one
(column 2: t=2.28; P=0.027).
To check the assumption that a positive emotional state
in subjects favours general recall, whatever the emotio-
nal content of the words, an analysis of variance was
carried out with paired data using the total words reca-
lled at the beginning of the session and after watching
each of the two clips. Results showed that the mean of
the total of recalled words differed between the first
stage (beginning of the session), the second and the third
(sad and happy films) (F=235.16; P<0.0005).
Comparisons carried out, corrected in accordance with
Bonferroni, indicated that the difference in number of
words recalled for each excerpt (d=18.7-18.4=0.3) was
not statistically significant (t=0.68; P=0.501). However,
the total mean number of words recalled before wat-
ching either of the film clips was statistically superior to
the mean number of words recalled after seeing the
happy excerpt (d=30.2-18.7=11.5; t=18.2; P<0.0005; CI
95%: 7.25 to 9.05) and the sad one (d=30.2-18.4=11.8;
t=16.28; P<0.0005; CI 95%: 7.35 to 9.42). 
Once it had been confirmed that recall of the group of
words was not affected by the mood state induced, the
next step was to check the hypothesis that recall of
words with emotional content is favoured if this content
is congruent with that of the film presented immediately
before. In order to do this, we carried out a factor analy-
sis of variance with paired data of the results summari-
sed in Table 2 and represented in Figure 1. 
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Table 1
Corrected mean (and SD) of scores on the adapted 
MAACL-R after each film
Happy film Sad film
Positive adjectives 0,3961 (0,239) 0,2499 (0,214)
Negative adjectives 0,0368 (0,052) 0,1645 (0,125)
Figure 1
Mean number of words recalled at beginning and 









Beginning of session                      Sad film                         Happy film
Positive words              Negative words             Neutral words
It was observed that after watching the happy film clip
the words with positive emotional content were those
best remembered (F=24.84; P<0.0001). Keeping the
type of film constant and applying the appropriate
corrected comparisons it was confirmed that the mean
number of words recalled with positive emotional con-
tent was superior to that of recalled words with  negati-
ve emotional content (t=2.55; P=0.014) and of recalled
neutral words (t=7.74; P<0.0005), and that the mean
number of words recalled with negative emotional con-
tent was superior to that of recalled neutral words
(t=4.38, P<0.0005). 
After watching the sad clip, the words with negative
emotional content were those most recalled (F=17.34;
P<0.0001). The applied comparisons indicated that the
mean number of words with negative emotional content
recalled was superior to the mean number of words with
positive emotional content (t=2.55; P=0.014) and neu-
tral words (t=2.89; P=0.006) recalled, and that the mean
number of words with positive emotional content reca-
lled was superior to that of neutral words recalled (t=7
40; P<0.0005).
Analysing the results obtained at the beginning of the
session (before watching the film clips) it was found
that the words with emotional content were better reca-
lled than the neutral words (F=17.34; P<0.0001). The
comparisons applied indicated that the average number
of words with negative emotional content recalled was
similar to the mean number of words with positive
emotional content recalled (t=0.12; P=0.90). Similarly,
the mean number of words with positive emotional
content recalled was superior to that of neutral words
recalled (t=5.66; P<0.0005), and the mean number of
words with negative emotional content recalled was
also superior to that of neutral words recalled (t=11.30;
P<0.00005). 
Keeping the emotional content of the words constant,
it was observed that there were no significant differen-
ces between the mean numbers of neutral words reca-
lled after each of the two film clips (t=0.24; P=0.813).
However, the mean number of words with positive
emotional recalled was superior after watching the
happy film (t=3.78; P<0.0005), and the mean number
of words with negative emotional content recalled was
superior after the sad film (t=2.81; P=0.007).
Moreover, it was found that the mean number of words
recalled (whatever their content) was always statisti-
cally superior at the beginning of the session (before
watching the films). 
A significant interaction was found between the num-
ber of positive and negative words recalled after wat-
ching each film clip (t=3.73; P=0.00051). 
The following step consisted in examining the rela-
tionship between the number of adjectives marked on
the MAACL-R adaptation and the number of positive or
negative words recalled in the memory tests. Although
both variables are clearly influenced by the content of
the film clips, there is no appreciable correlation betwe-
en them (see Table 3).
Finally, with the aim of checking whether prior mood
state influenced the results, we calculated the correlation
matrix and the level of bilateral significance of the sco-
res obtained on the BDI and STAI-E with the rest of the
dependent variables. The results were not significant
except in two cases: the number of positive adjectives
chosen after watching the happy film clip presented a
negative correlation (r=0.30, P=0.017) with the score
obtained on the BDI, and the number of negative adjec-
tives chosen after watching the happy film presented a
positive correlation (r=0.39, P=0.003) with the score
obtained on the STAI-E. 
DISCUSSION 
The first result worthy of comment is that each film clip
induced a different affective state. Such a statement is
based on the score obtained for the adapted MAACL-R
list of adjectives, from which subjects have to choose
words describing their current mood. Although there is
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Table 2
Mean number of words recalled at beginning 
of session and in each state
Neutral words Positive words Negative words
Beginning of session 5,90 12,12 12,20
Happy film 4,388 7,878 6,429
Sad film 4,469 6,143 7,755
Table 3
Correlations between scores on the adapted MAACL-R (Adjectives)
and number of words remembered: correlation coefficient
(significance level)
Happy film                              Sad film
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
words words words words
Positive adjectives 0,0733 -0,2683 0,0955 0,0423
(P=0,617) (P=0,062) (P=0,514) (P=0,773)
Negative adjectives 0,0949 0,0683 0,0950 0,0714
(P=0,517) (P=0,641) (P=0,516) (P=0,626)
no doubt that subjective expression of mood state was
different after each clip and congruent with their con-
tent, it is also true that the intensity of affect induced by
each film, especially the sad one, was no more than
moderate, since in either case the number of positive
adjectives marked was superior to the number of negati-
ve adjectives marked. A possible interpretation of this
result would be to postulate that peopleÕs neutral or nor-
mal state tends more to the positive than the negative,
and that the effect of the sad film would have been, rat-
her than inducing a negative state, to reduce the magni-
tude of this supposedly happy or positive normal state.
In any case, it would seem that for the type of subject
participating in this study Ðuniversity studentsÐ it is
easier to induce happy mood states than sad ones. 
Moving on to analyse the effects on recall of words, we
see that the results coincide with those generally obtai-
ned in the literature in this area (Cohen, Eysenck and
Levi, 1986). It seems clear that words with emotional
connotations are normally recalled more easily than neu-
tral ones. We have also seen that the first time the
memory test is carried out, recall is better than the two
subsequent times, possibly due to proactive interference,
since the subject is attempting each time to remember
the same words but in a different order (Crouse, 1971).
Nevertheless, these differences in recall between the
first test and the subsequent ones do not affect the diffe-
rential results according to type of film. 
Mood state did not influence in an appreciable way the
total quantity of recall, but it did affect the number of
emotionally marked words, and this effect was con-
gruent with film content: whilst in the first test there
were no differences between positive or negative words
recalled, after the happy clip more positive than negati-
ve words were recalled, with the opposite effect being
observed after the sad clip. Thus, these results confirm
the notion that recall bias produced by congruence bet-
ween subjectÕs mood state and the emotional content of
words can be observed even though the mood state indu-
ced is weak; put another way, it is not necessary to indu-
ce really intense mood states in order to observe this
phenomenon. 
If we look at the correlations between number of posi-
tive and negative adjectives marked by subjects and
number of positive words and negative words recalled,
we see that they amount to practically nil. This gives
greater force to the supposition that they are two inde-
pendent effects. It would appear that recall bias does not
depend on the subjectÕs affective experience at time of
recall. 
These results, taken overall, support the hypothesis of
Rholes et al (1987), which assumes that the effect of
mood states on recall, and possibly on other cognitive
processes, depends not on the intensity of the affective
experience, but mainly on the cognitive context activa-
ted. The presentation of sad situations appears to facili-
tate the processing of information associated with sad
situations, without the subject necessarily feeling parti-
cularly sad. Obviously, it must be recognised that our
data does not rule out the role of affect in emotionally
intense situations; rather, it simply demonstrates the pos-
sibility of the effect of emotional situations on cognitive
processing irrespective, or relatively independently, of
the emotional or affective experience. That this state has
been induced by means of a film, and with no specific
instructions, seems to us to lend greater force and ecolo-
gical validity to this result. 
The fact that the scores on anxiety and depression
influenced the adjectives marked on the MAACL-R and
not the words recalled confirms what has been stated
above. Also, this result is congruent with the fact, alre-
ady observed in the literature on the topic and mentioned
by Matthews and MacLeod (1994), that variables of
state of an emotional nature influence  the link between
emotion and selective processing of information in an
interactive way, contributing to the modulation of the
intensity of mood state. 
We believe that the data from this study can help to
analyse the way people who do not feel strong affect
cope with   emotional situations. Attempts have been
made to explain this type of reaction through various
concepts, such as repression (Byrne, 1964), avoidance
(Krohne, 1993) or alexitimia (Martnez Snchez, 1995),
which, while differing among themselves, have in com-
mon the notion of the absence of the experience and
expression of emotions in situations that require them. It
is clear, too, that this absence of affect is of decisive
importance in the process of coping with situations of
stress. In our case it has been demonstrated that normal
subjects can think as though they were sad without fee-
ling especially sad. Applying this possibility to people
who do not express affect, or do not feel it in manifestly
emotional situations, our data opens the door to the idea
that blocking out the perception of oneÕs own mood state
or its expression does not necessarily imply also bloc-
king out the cognitive effects of ÔsadÕ situations of thre-
at or failure, and  contributes to the search for ways of
assessing emotional impact independently of the affecti-
ve experience. 
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